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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
No. 11-1289 
_____________ 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v. 
JUWAN SHAW, 
               Appellant 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 08-cr-00476) 
District Judge: Hon. Michael M. Baylson 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a), 
March 8, 2012  
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SCIRICA  
and AMBRO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: April 26, 2012) 
_____________ 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 
Juwan Shaw appeals his conviction for multiple robberies that were joined for 
trial.  He argues that the robberies were improperly joined in violation of Federal Rule of 
2 
 
Criminal Procedure 8(a).  Alternatively, he makes the related claim that the District Court 
erred in denying his motion for a severance.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.1
I. 
 
 We review de novo a claim of improper joinder of counts under Rule 8(a).  United 
States v. Irizarry, 341 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2003).  “If we determine that counts were 
improperly joined, we must undertake a harmless error analysis to see if prejudice 
resulted.”  Id. (citing United States v. McGill, 964 F.2d 222, 241 (3d Cir. 1992)).  Relief 
will only be granted in the absence of actual prejudice.  United States v. Gorecki, 813 
F.2d 40, 42 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438 (1986)). 
 Rule 8(a) provides: 
The indictment or information may charge a defendant in separate 
counts with 2 or more offenses if the offenses charged . . . are of the 
same or similar character, or are based on the same act or 
transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a common 
scheme or plan. 
 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a).   
Shaw argues that the District Court erred in concluding that the robberies were of 
a similar character because they occurred at different times, involved varying degrees of 
force, and involved different victims.  He notes that the third robbery was not of an 
individual but of a restaurant and was thus was not of similar character to the other two.  
Shaw’s argument is unpersuasive.  The robberies occurred over a five-month period in 
the same neighborhood near Shaw’s residence, and all three robberies involved one 
                                            
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C § 3231, and we have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
3 
 
robber who demanded money from his victim while holding the victim at gunpoint with a 
small revolver.2
II. Severance 
  We agree with the District Court that the differences advanced by Shaw 
were insufficient to negate the similarity among the three robberies for purposes of Rule 
8(a).  Moreover, Shaw has failed to prove actual prejudice resulting from the District 
Court’s joinder of the charged offenses.  Thus, we conclude that joinder was proper under 
Rule 8(a). 
 We review a district court’s denial of a motion to sever under Rule 14 for abuse of 
discretion.  Gorecki, 813 F.2d at 42.  Rule 14 allows the district court to sever counts if 
joinder “appears to prejudice a defendant or the government.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a).  
However, “even if the district court abused its discretion in denying the severance 
motion, the defendant must pinpoint ‘clear and substantial prejudice’ resulting in an 
unfair trial.”  United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 340 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting United 
States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 568 (3d Cir. 1991)).  “It is not enough to show that 
severance would have increased the defendant’s chances of acquittal.”  Id.   
 Shaw contends that he wished to testify with regard to the Lucky’s Pizza robbery; 
however, joinder of the offenses caused him to surrender his right to testify in his own 
                                            
2 Although the Lucky’s Pizza robbery ultimately involved two victims, only Mauro 
Garcia was at the front of the restaurant when Shaw initiated the robbery.  The restaurant 
owner, Harisios Pavlou, was in the back and only came to the front of the restaurant after 
the initiation of the robbery.  Thus, the robber in each case targeted a lone victim. 
Although it could be argued that this is characteristic of most robberies and not 
necessarily suggestive of common character, there are clearly enough similarities among 
all of the robberies Shaw was charged with to support the District Court’s exercise of 
discretion here. 
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defense because he feared that testifying with regard to only one robbery would lead the 
jury to speculate on the reasons for his failure to testify regarding the other two robberies 
and thereby infer guilt from his silence.  Although we do not deny that Shaw may have 
faced that dilemma, it is not enough to establish error. 
Severance is required “only where the defendant makes a convincing showing that 
he has both important testimony to give concerning one count and strong need to refrain 
from testifying on the other.”  United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 401 (3d Cir. 
1981) (quoting Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1968)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  To make such a showing, defendant must “present enough 
information regarding the nature of the testimony he wishes to give on one count and his 
reasons for not wishing to testify on the other to satisfy the court that the claim of 
prejudice is genuine.”  Id. (quoting Baker, 401 F.2d at 977) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Here, the District Court correctly concluded that Shaw had failed to make the 
requisite showing. 
Shaw also argues that the jury may have cumulated the evidence relating to the 
three robberies rather than weighing the evidence for each robbery separately.  “Of 
primary concern in considering a motion for severance is whether the jury can reasonably 
be expected to compartmentalize the evidence, as it relates to each count.”  Id. (quoting 
United States v. DeLarosa, 450 F.2d 1057, 1065 (3d Cir. 1971)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Here, the District Court instructed the jury to consider each offense separately 
and warned the jury that “the number of offenses charged is not evidence of guilt, and 
this should not influence your decision in any way.”  It is well-settled that “juries are 
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presumed to follow their instructions.”  Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 540 (1993) 
(quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987)).  “[T]hus we regard the 
instructions as persuasive evidence that refusals to sever did not prejudice” the defendant.  
United States v. Walker, 657 F.3d 160, 171 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Lore, 
430 F.3d 190, 206 (3d Cir. 2005)).  Moreover, the fact that the jury convicted Shaw of the 
robberies of the TastyKake deliveryman and of Lucky’s Pizza, but acquitted him of the 
robbery of the Domino’s deliveryman, strongly undermines Shaw’s claim that the jury 
may have lumped all the evidence together rather than considering the evidence of each 
robbery separately. 
Finally, Shaw argues that he was prejudiced because joinder encouraged the jury 
to infer a criminal disposition on his part and made the jury hostile toward him.  As 
explained previously, the District Court warned the jury not to infer guilt from the 
number of offenses charged, and we presume that the jury followed the court’s 
instruction.  Shaw’s contention that joinder of offenses made the jury hostile is sheer 
speculation.  That argument could be leveled against every instance of joinder.    
Moreover, as the District Court noted, the three robberies were not so dissimilar in nature 
that one was more likely to arouse hostility than another.  Thus, we conclude that Shaw 
has failed to make the requisite showing of actual prejudice to require severance under 
Rule 14.   
III. 
   For the reasons stated above, we will affirm Shaw’s conviction and the District 
Court’s denial of Shaw’s motion to sever.  
